| The Outside World |

Monday, October 4, 2004

We Must Learn the Lessons of Rocky IV
And Studiously Avoid Going to See Rocky VI
NEWS ANALYSIS by Konstantin Medvedovsky

"I ask you, what has changed? Has the danger from the Russian side been lessoned? No. Rather, the delusion of the ruling classes of Europe has reached its pinnacle. Above all, nothing has changed in Russia's policy, as her official historian Karamsin admits. Her methods, her tactics, her maneuvers may change, but the pole star -world domination-is immutable."

-Karl Marx

Over the last month in Russia, a series of events has unfolded which have given credence to pundits who are wary of the direction in which the former socialist nation is going. Far from the shining example of democracy that many hoped it would become, Russia has continued to move further from being a benevolent liberal democracy, and further towards a totalitarian state similar to the Soviet Union. It began with a set of terrorist incidents last month, likely perpetrated by Chechen separatists.

These incidents, which included a subway bombing, and the simultaneous downing of two airliners, culminated in a school hostage situation in the southern Russian city of Beslan, which left over 330 dead. In part because more than half the dead were children, the incident seemed poised to seriously change the Russian political sphere. Speaking soon after the conclusion of the siege, Russian president Vladimir Putin appeared shaken, going as far as to say "[Russia] showed weakness and weak people are beaten."

However, while the fallout over the Beslan incident was expected to be particularly harsh, the Kremlin's reaction has turned out to be somewhat of a non sequitur. Instead of the expected massive military response, Putin has instead taken the opportunity to further cement his dominance over the Russian political sphere. To a degree, this might have been simply because Russia has already done its worst in Chechnya, having essentially leveled the entire city of Grozny.

However, the political changes he implemented have not been merely aesthetic. Specifically, he has revoked the right of many Russian regions to elect their own regional governments. Additionally, he has said the State Duma, parliament's lower house, will be elected solely from party lists in the future.

These antidemocratic steps, while distressing, are nothing new for the Putin. In the most recent presidential elections, Putin did not allow opposition candidates to advertise on television. He has also taken to imprisoning political prisoners such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky, principle owner of the Russian oil giant Yukos. In an especially bizarre incident last year, a leading opposition candidate mysteriously vanished for a week, only to return and say he was withdrawing from the race; no explanation was given. Additionally, Putin has consolidated his control over the Russian media, to the point where there are no television stations in Russia which are not state run.

Perhaps the most fascinating part of this blatant election tampering is that in true Nixonian fashion, Putin was winning with a landslide majority in every published poll. Given that, realistically, there was no chance that Putin would fail to secure reelection, his attacks on the Russian democratic system point to a more systematic desire to change the nature of government in Russia, rather than a desire for more personal power. Additionally, Putin is term limited, which largely rules out the idea that he was taking these steps to protect himself for a future election. It may signal that Putin has rejected the notion that a democratic form of government is right for Russia.

This shift for Russia, while troublesome internally, also has had implications on the world stage, reaching from China, to the ongoing genocide in Sudan. As in so many other situations, oil has been the catalyst for the developments. Russia is the world's largest producer of oil, as well as holder of the world's largest yet untapped supply of oil. As a result, just as they have in the United States, Russian oil interests have proven the ability to wield a tremendous amount of influence on international affairs.

Starting with the arrest of Khodorkovsky last year, Putin has been engaged in a very public battle with the Yukos, the largest Russian oil company. The government has charged that Yukos owes seven billion dollars in back taxes, a charge that Yukos has denied. The latest strike in the ongoing legal and political battle that has ensued has shown the particularly cunning of Yukos.

Mere days before Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao was due in Moscow to discuss the future of Chinese imports of Russian oil with Putin, Yukos announced that they were cutting two thirds of their shipments to China. Given that one of the main selling points of Russia as an oil supplier has been its recent stability relative to other major sources, cutting shipments now has proven to be embarrassing for the Kremlin. Yukos, which accounts for nearly all of the country's direct exports to China, has claimed it has been forced to do this because it is incapable of paying the overhead associated with the shipments. The claimed that the reason they can't pay that overhead is the prohibitive costs of their legal battle with the government.

The result of this maneuver, however, might prove to be more wide reaching than just damaging Russia's relationship with China. Given that Yukos alone supplies nearly 10% of China's oil needs, a cut in that level could prove disastrous to the rapidly growing Chinese economy if it comes in concert with problems securing another oil supplier. As it happens, a major source of oil for China is Sudan. With the Russian supply disruption ongoing, China, which would have no other clear reason for doing so, now appears poised to veto any UN Security Council resolution which would put an oil embargo on Sudanese oil. Just such a move is what has been bandied about in recent days by the United States and Great Britain in response to the ongoing crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan.

A desire to save Sudanese lives, however, appears unlikely to motivate Putin to agree to ease off on Yukos in hopes of buying Chinese support for such a resolution. Besides the fact that Sudan is also major buyer of Russian arms, and would no longer be able to do so if sanctions were passed, Putin seemingly aims to nationalize Russian oil through legal means. Given that, and the fact that his entire political platform has been based around a policy of strengthening Russian world influence, he appears unlikely to back off for humanitarian reasons. Putin sees Russia, not as a former great power, but rather as a great power in remission, and he appears willing to do almost anything, legal or extralegal to restore Russian military and political prestige.